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NEW BALANCE IN THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AND
DEBTORS:THE EFFECT ON MARYLAND LAW
Charles M. Tatelbaumt
The author analyzes the basis of recent decisions which have
held state procedures for prejudgment attachment and replevin
unconstitutional. He considers the effect of these decisions,
which establish a new balance in the rights of debtors and
creditors, on Maryland provisional creditors' remedies. His
conclusion is that, although the Maryland procedure for
attachments on original process will probably survive attack, the
procedures for replevin and distress will not.
During the past few years, court decisions based on the fourteenth
amendment have greatly enhanced the constitutional rights of debtors.
In June 1969, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,' the United States
Supreme Court held a Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnishment statute
unconstitutional because the statute failed to provide for notice and an
opportunity for a hearing to the debtor before freezing his wages. Three
years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin,2 the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional the Florida replevin statute because it also failed to provide for
notice and a hearing prior to seizure of disputed goods. Other courts
have found other pretrial creditors' remedies unconstitutional, includ-
ing other prejudgment attachments and garnishments,3 distress,4 and
innkeepers' liens.'
This article reviews the basis for these decisions and considers how
they are likely to affect some Maryland creditors' remedies. Part I
consists of a brief examination of due process considerations. Recent
developments in the case law are discussed in Part II, and in Part III the
Maryland procedures for attachment on original process, replevin and
distress are considered.
f Charles M. Tatelbaum, A.B., University of Maryland; J.D., University of
Maryland; Partner, Schimmel & Tatelbaum, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland.
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 5 Cal. 3d
536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972).
4. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
5. See, e.g., Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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PART I: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The fourteenth amendment requires that property be taken by state
action only in accordance with "due process of law." 6 This vague
phrase has been interpreted to mean that a taking of property must be
preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard.7 Generally, the
hearing must precede the taking, but in some situations the hearing may
be postponed.' Courts which have considered the validity of procedural
rules authorizing a taking prior to an opportunity to be heard have
generally employed a balancing test.9 In weighing the competing
governmental and private interests served or affected by these rules, it is
necessary to consider the nature of the interests affected, the manner in
which this is accomplished, the justifications for proceeding in that
manner, and the available alternative procedures.'"
The countervailing interests to be weighed in considering the
constitutionality of creditors' pretrial remedies include those of the
6. "[N ]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they
may enjoy that right they must be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233
(1863). In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), the
Court stated:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due
Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that dep-
rivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
8. Due process requires "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where
some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until
after the event." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
9. See Note, Attachment and Garnishment-Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law-
Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach
Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 986, 995 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Note, 68 MICH. L. REv.). Some examples of applications of the bal-
ancing test are: "Against this interest of the State we must balance the individual interest
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). "[CJonsideration of what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination
of the precise nature of the governmental function involved as well as of the private inter-
est that has been affected by governmental action." Cafeteria Worker's Local 473 v. Mc-
Elroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). "The extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded ... depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss [of wel-
fare benefits] outweighs the government interest in summary adjudication." Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
10. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951), stated:
Due Process is not a mechanical instrument .... It is a delicate process of ad-
justment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment ....
... The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives
to the procedure that was followed . the balance of hurt complained of and good
accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the judi-
cial judgment.
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state, creditors and debtors.' I State procedures for the prompt and
efficient collection of debts encourage creditors to extend credit, and
thus enhance economic growth.'2 The public has a corresponding
interest in the protection of debtors and consumers against unjustified
seizure of their property.' '
The pretrial remedies considered in this. article aid creditors in three
ways. First, the remedies generally insure that if the creditor is
successful in establishing his claim in the main action against the
debtor, there will be a fund out of which the judgment can be satisfied.
Second, pretrial remedies give creditors leverage in negotiating
settlements that avoid costly trials. Third, the procedures aid the
creditor in bringing the debtor into court.
The debtor's interest lies in the continued use of his property, free
from unwarranted interference. To protect that interest, a debtor has a
right to notice and a hearing prior to the taking. But if the state or
creditor's interests outweigh the debtor's interest in a particular
situation, then his property may be seized prior to judgment.
The remainder of this article will show how courts have balanced
these countervailing interests in considering the validity of some
procedures that allow seizure without prior notice and a hearing.
PART II: SNIADACH AND FUENTES
A. Sniadach
Prior to the Sniadach decision, pretrial remedies such as attachment
and garnishment had gone unchallenged for over forty years. These
remedies were generally justified on the basis that the taking was only
temporary, and that an opportunity for a hearing was provided in the
trial of the main action. The leading case was McKay v. McInnes,"
which rejected a challenge on due process grounds to a Maine statute
permitting prejudgment attachment. Pursuant to the statute, a lien was
imposed on the defendant's real property. The state court found that
the statutory lien was indeed a taking of property,' ' but concluded
11. See Note, 68 MICH. L. REV. at 996; Note, Attachment in California, A New Look at an Old
Writ, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1254, 1258-64 (1970).
12. This basic assumption has not gone unchallenged. See Note, 68 MICH. L. REV. at 997;
Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment In Light of Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 837,846 (1970).
13. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 723 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). Cf. Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
14. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), affd per curiam, 297 U.S. 820 (1928).
15. The court stated:
Property in legal conception is the total of the rights and powers incident to a
thing rather than the thing itself. The legal right to use and derive a profit from
land or other things is property. And the power of disposition at the will of the
owner is property. Deprivation does not require actual physical taking of property
or the thing itself. It takes place when the free use and enjoyment of the thing or
the power to dispose of it at will is affected.
Id. at 116, 141 A. at 702 (citation omitted).
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that the taking did not violate due processs in that it was temporary
and conditional upon the outcome of the main action and the debtor
was afforded an opportunity to be heard at the trial. The Supreme
Court affirmed in a one-sentence per curiam opinion.' 6
The Court undertook an active review of this subject in Sniadach,
where the statute in question' ' allowed the creditor to request the court
clerk to issue a garnishee summons to freeze the debtor's wages subject
to a weekly subsistence allowance.' s No provision was made for notice
or hearing prior to garnishment, although the creditor was required to
serve the summons and complaint on the debtor within ten days after
service on the garnishee.'" Mrs. Sniadach's employer was served
pursuant to the statute by her creditor, who claimed she owed $420 on
a promissory note. Mrs. Sniadach moved to dismiss the garnishment
proceedings for failure to satisfy due process. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court,2 ° basing its decision on McKay v. McInnes, sustained the
statute, but the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court held
that because Mrs. Sniadach had been deprived of a significant property
interest (the use of her wages during the period between the
garnishment and the trial of the main action) she must be given notice
and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the taking.2' The statute did
not provide an opportunity for a prior hearing, and was therefore
unconstitutional.
The result in Sniadach cast considerable doubt on the validity of the
basic assumption of the earlier attachment cases2 - t h a t the taking is
justified, as it was merely temporary and conditional. Although notice
and an opportunity to be heard were not provided prior to the
attachment, they were required prior to sale of the property. While the
16. The Court affirmed on the authority of Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), and Coffin
Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928). In Ownbey the Court upheld a Delaware stat-
ute requiring a nonresident defendant to post security equal to the value of the property
attached as a condition to making an appearance for the purpose of presenting a defense.
The purpose of the statute was said to be to provide a means of collecting debts with the
incidental purpose of compelling the nonresident debtor's appearance. It was upheld on
this basis and because it had been sanctioned by long use. In Coffin Bros. the question
was whether a Georgia statute providing a means for prompt collection of assessments
from shareholders of insolvent banks met the requirements of due process. The statute
authorized the Superintendent of Banks to issue executions against shareholders' prop-
erty without a prior hearing if they failed to pay their assessments after notice. However,
if the stockholder protested by filing an affidavit of illegality, a hearing was held. But until
a decision was rendered in the main action, a lien was imposed on the property attached.
The Court upheld the statute because it provided for a full hearing after creation of the
lien, but before the property was sold, and because prejudgment liens were commonly
accepted remedies in Georgia.
17. Act of Dec. 21, 1965, ch. 507, § 1, [1965] Wis. Laws 795, as amended Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
267.01-.24 (Supp. 1972).
18. Act of Dec. 21, 1965, ch. 507, § 1, [1965] Wis. Laws 795, 801, as amended Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 267.18(2)(a) (Supp. 1972).
19. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.07 (Supp. 1972).
20. Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1969), rev'd, 395 U.S.
337 (1969).
21. 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. See pp. 238-39 & note 16 supra.
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statutory scheme considered in Sniadach was essentially similar in that
respect, the fact that the taking was temporary did not save the
Wisconsin statute. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, distin-
guished the earlier cases by asserting that pretrial remedies which failed
to provide for notice and a hearing prior to the seizure met the
requirements of due process only in extraordinary situations requiring
special protection for a state or creditor interest.2" While the earlier
cases involved unusual circumstances which tipped the balance of
interests in favor of the state procedural rule in questions,2 4 the facts
in Sniadach presented a situation requiring no special protection for a
state or creditor interest.
The Sniadach Court's application of the balancing test was not
explicit. The hardships caused by pretrial garnishment of wages were
repeatedly emphasized,2 s but at no point were the interests of the state
or of the creditors discussed, except for the assertion that the facts of
Sniadach did not present the special state or creditor interest needed to
justify the procedure.2 6 It is clear, however, that a more thorough
consideration of state and creditor interests would have made no
difference in the outcome. The well-documented hardships imposed by
23. Justice Douglas commented:
Such summary procedure may well meet the requirementsi of duei process in
extraordinary situations [citing Ownbey and Coffin Bros.]. But in the present case
no situation requiring special proection to a state or creditor interest is presented
by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual
condition.
395 U.S. at 339.
24. In Ownbey the special interest was the state interest in providing a forum for creditors in
actions against non-residents. Prompt action was required in Coffin Bros. to preserve
public faith in the banking system. Justice Douglas' treatment of McKay is less clear. He
stated:
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general,
see McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820, does not necessarily satisfy procedural due
process in every case. The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal
regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its modern
forms.
395 U.S. at 340. The statement appears to affirm McKay but to find it inapplicable to
wage garnishments. See Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn.
1971). Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, questioned McKay: "And I am quite un-
willing to take the unexplicated per curiam in McKay v. McInnes... as vitiating or di-
luting these essential elements of due process." 395 U.S. at 343-44. In contrast, Justice
Black would have affirmed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the authority
of McKay. Id. at 348:
25. Justice Douglas asserted: "A prejudgment. garnishment of the Wisconsin type may im-
pose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support." 395 U.S. at 340.
He identified these hardships as loss of income (particularly where the statutory exemp-
tion was inadequate as in Wisconsin), discharge from employment, and additional fi-
nancing charges when the debtor agrees to refinance the loan to obtain release of his
wages. "The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a
practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall." Id. at 342.
26. The author of Note, 68 MicH. L. REV. at 996-97, criticizes the Sniadach Court for not dis-
cussing the relative weight of the public and creditor interests but concludes that such a
discussion would have made no difference in the result. In the absence of special circum-
stances the interests of creditors and the public in a prejudgment garnishment statute
are those described generally at pp. 237-38 supra.
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prejudgment garnishment of wages should outweigh any interest that
the state or a creditor might assert under the facts presented in
Sniadach. Furthermore, an effective alternative procedure was available
to collect the debt in that Mrs. Sniadach was a resident of Wisconsin
(thus, in personam jurisdiction was readily available 7 ), and her wages
could have been garnished after a judgment was obtained.
While the holding in Sniadach was limited to prejudgment
garnishment of wages, the Court's broad language2" suggested that the
same principle might apply to other pretrial remedies.
B. Interpreting Sniadach
For several years after the Sniadach decision, there was considerable
uncertainty as to ,its interpretation and application. Some courts
construed it narrowly to apply only to pretrial garnishment of wages,2 9
while other courts held that it applied to any property that was a
"necessity of life." 3 0 Still other courts have construed it broadly and
applied it to prejudgment attachments generally, 3 to replevin3 2 and
27. 395 U.S. at 339. The Court's discussion suggests that the nonresidence of a defendant is
an "extraordinary situation" justifying pretrial seizure.
28. See note 23 supra.
29. See, e.g., American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supj. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970)
(holding Hawaii's prejudgment garnishment statute constitutional with respect to cor-
porate checking accounts, payroll accounts and accounts receivable); First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Pomona Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d 184 (1971);Western Bd. of Ad-
justors, Inc. v. Covina Publishing, Inc., 9 Cal. App. 3d 662, 88 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1970).
Courts finding that Sniadach was limited to prejudgment garnishment of wages have
generally quoted the following statement from Justice Douglas' opinion: "We deal here
with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system." 395 U.S. at 340. E.g., "Sniadach, in this Court's opinion, only carved out the
garnishment of wages ... as an exception to the Supreme Court's ruling in McKay v.
McInnes ... " Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 1971)
(citation omitted).
30. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (vari-
ous items of household furniture were necessities); Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127
(E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (stereo, watch,
and diamond rings were not necessities); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.
Fla. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (stereo and gas stove were not necessities); Aaron v.
Clark, 342 F. Supp 898 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (savings account for college tuition was a special-
ized form of property similar to wages). The application of Sniadach only to "necessities"
is consistent with the balancing approach. The effect of the deprivation is more serious
when such property is involved and a more important state or creditor interest should be
required to justify pretrial seizure. But the doctrine requires the difficult task of deter-
mining in each case whether the property seized is a "necessity." Further, the distinction
is illogical. The fourteenth amendment does not distinguish between various kinds of
property. The argument was repudiated in Fuentes v. Shevin: "The relative weight of
property interests is relevant, of course, to the form of notice and hearing required ...
But some form of notice and hearing-formal or informal-is required before deprivation
of a property interest that 'cannot be described as de minimus.' " 407 U.S. at 90 n.21 (ci-
tations omitted) (first emphasis added, second in original).
31. See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 5 Cal. 3d
536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Jones Press,
Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Larson v.
Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
32. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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distress3" statutes, and to other creditors' remedies.3" While later
Supreme Court decisions contained harbingers of a broad construction
of Sniadach,3 s its proper application to creditors' provisional remedies
was not lucidly defined until recently in Fuentes v. Shevin.3"
Obviously, this case marks an important turning point in the rights of
creditors and debtors.
C. Fuentes
The Florida3 and Pennsylvania3 replevin statutes considered in
Fuentes were similar in operation. The Florida statute authorized any
person whose goods were wrongfully detained to obtain a writ of
replevin 3 9 by alleging in his complaint that he was entitled to
possession of the chattels, and posting a bond in at least double the
value of the property to be replevied." ° The writ commanded the
officer to whom it was directed to seize the goods and to summons the
defendant. 4 After seizure, he was required to hold the property for
three days before delivering it to the plaintiff pending final
judgment.4 2 The defendant could obtain return of the property by
posting his own bond within the three-day period during which the
officer held the property.4 3 This procedure obviously did not provide
either notice or an opportunity for a hearing prior to seizure of the
disputed goods.
The factual structure of Fuentes was simple: Mrs. Fuentes purchased
a gas stove and a stereo under conditional sales contracts. When a
dispute arose over the servicing of the stove and she withheld payments,
the conditional seller obtained a writ of replevin and repossessed the
goods. At this point, Mrs. Fuentes brought an action in a federal district
court challenging the constitutionality of the Florida procedure;
33. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1970).
34. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeepers' lien).
35. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (notice and opportunity for a hearing required be-
fore termination of welfare benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (Georgia statute
providing for suspension of motor vehicle registration and operator's license of uninsured
motorist involved in accident, unless he posted security for the amount of damages
claimed, held unconstitutional without a prior hearing as to the reasonable possibility of
obtaining judgment against him).
36. 407 U.S. 67.
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-.21 (Supp. 1973).
38. 12 PA. STAT. § 1821 (1967), authorizes writs of replevin. The procedures for replevin actions
are found in PA. App. R. Civ. P. 1071-87.
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1973).
40. Id. § 78.01. The purpose of the bond requirement is to ensure that if the defendant is suc-
cessful in defending the main action he will be able to recover from the plaintiff at least
the value of the goods replevied and any expenses incurred in the action.
41. Id. § 78.08.




however, the district court upheld the procedure.4 4 The Supreme
Court reversed in a four-to-three decision, holding that the Florida
statute "worked a deprivation of property without due process of law
insofar as it denied the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before
chattels are taken from their possessor."4" The Court did not hold that
a debtor could not be deprived of his property prior to final judgment,
but only that his property could not be taken until his creditor had
established the probable validity of his claim at a prior hearing.4 6
Three arguments justifying the prejudgment writ of replevin were
presented. The first of these asserted that the taking was only
temporary because the state procedure allowed the defendant an
opportunity to recover the goods immediately by posting his own bond
in double their value. In rejecting this contention, the Court remarked
that Sniadach had established that even a temporary, nonfinal,
deprivation of property was nonetheless a taking within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment.4 ' Further, the requirement that the
defendant post a bond to obtain return of the property was itself said
to be a taking.4 8
Second, it was argued that the debtor had no interest protected by
the fourteenth amendment because the seller had retained legal title by
the conditional sales contracts. The Court pointed out that the
possessory right of the vendees was a significant property interest and
was protected by the fourteenth amendment.4
Fuentes finally rejected the argument that a prior hearing was
required only when the property taken was an absolute necessity of
life. This argument was apparently based on those cases narrowly
interpreting Sniadach to apply only when the necessities of life were
taken .5 0 The Court found that the fourteenth amendment applied to
deprivation of any significant property interest. The transaction
considered in Fuentes involved consumer goods, and courts could limit
its future application to replevin of such goods; however, the Court's
broad language in rejecting the third argument would appear to
preclude such a narrow construction."
44. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Pennsylvania procedure was upheld in Epps v. Cortese, 326 F.
Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Parham v. Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
45. 407 U.S. at 96.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 84-85.
48, Id. at 85.
49. Id. at 86.
50. See note 30 supra.
51. The Court stated: "[I]f the root principle of procedural due process is to be applied with
objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of
'property' generally." 407 U.S. at 90. In a non-consumer transaction, a creditor may be
able to proceed through a replevin action without prior hearing if he obtains a waiver of
the debtor's right to that hearing. See pp. 254-56 infra.
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The Court's discussion of the state and creditor interests furthered
by a state prejudgment replevin procedure was not extensive. The
private interest in an inexpensive procedure for obtaining possession of
disputed goods,5 2 and the state interest in limiting the burden which a
prior hearing would impose on its judicial machinery 3 were found to
be insufficient to outweigh the debtor's right to a prior hearing. The
Court did not mention the creditor's interest in preventing further use
and deterioration of the disputed property, 4 nor did it discuss the
public interest in enhancement of retail credit furthered through
efficient debt collection procedures such as prejudgment replevin.'
Nonetheless, it appears that these interests were not sufficient to shift
the scales.
Thus, the Fuentes Court adhered to the Sniadach view that in
ordinary circumstances neither the state interest in protecting creditors
nor the creditor interests themselves could outweigh the right of the
52. The Court stated:
By allowing repossession without an opportunity for a prior hearing, the
Florida and Pennsylvania statutes may be intended specifically to reduce the
costs for the private party seeking to seize goods in another party's possession
.... The appellees argue that the cost of holding hearings may be especially oner-
ous in the context of the creditor-debtor relationship. But the Court's holding in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. undisputably demonstrates that ordinary
hearing costs are no more able to override due process rights in the creditor-debtor
context than in other contexts.
Id. at 92 n.29. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
53. In a note the Court commented:
A prior hearing imposes some cost in time, effort, and expense, and it is often
more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But these rather
ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right.... Procedural due process
is not intended to promote efficiency or accomodate all possible interests: it is in-
tended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are
about to be taken.
407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
54. The district court's discussion in Epps v. Cortese describes the state and creditor inter-
ests more fully:
Clearly, the State has a countervailing interest in summary seizure by replevin
which is to be weighed against the plaintiffs' right not to be temporarily deprived
of their property prior to a hearing on the merits. Initially, summary seizure con-
serves State financial resources and administrative time in reducing the number of
evidentiary hearings in a given lawsuit. Additionally, the State and creditor inter-
ests coincide in providing a protective remedy for those who have retained title to
or security interest in specific and unspecialized property by authorizing proce-
dures designed to prevent destruction, misuse or concealment of property by the
debtor pending final disposition. Adequate remedies made available to creditor in-
terests are necessary to the preservation and continuation of retail credit. . . . To
deny the creditor an adequate and practical remedy may deny the debtor of his
only means of obtaining many widely accepted, but costly items. .... The preser-
vation of adequate remedies is also necessary to the maintenance of many large
and small retail businesses without which our economy might well substantially
decline to the detriment of the very individuals whom plaintiff's here seek to pro-
tect.
326 F. Supp. 127, 135-36 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See 407 U.S. at 103 for similar comment by Jus-
tice White, dissenting.
55. See p. 238 supra.
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debtor to notice and a hearing before his property is taken. Only in
unusual circumstances, requiring special protection to a state or
creditor interest, may a debtor's property be seized prior to notice and
hearing.
The Fuentes Court asserted that past Supreme Court decisions had
allowed summary seizure only in a few limited circumstances. The
Court found three factors common in such cases:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a
government official responsible for determining, under the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary in
the particular instance." 6
As examples of such situations, the Court suggested an attachment
might be necessary to secure jurisdiction over a nonresident defen-
dant,"' and a seizure might be needed to prevent a debtor from
destroying or concealing disputed goods.' 8 In order to survive
constitutional attack, a statute authorizing pretrial seizure without
notice and hearing must be narrowly drawn to limit its use to such
special situations, 9 and it must allow for the maintenance of effective
control over the use of state power.
The new balance of creditors' and debtors' rights established in
Sniadach and Fuentes is likely to have substantial impact on other
pretrial remedies. The probable effect of these decisions on some
Maryland procedures will be considered in Part III.
56. 407 U.S. at 91.
57. In a note the Court stated:
In three cases, the Court has allowed the attachment of property without a prior
hearing. In one, the attachment was necessary to protect the public against...
a bank failure [citing Coffin Bros.]. Another case involved attachment neces-
sary to secure jurisdiction in state court-clearly a most basic and important
public interest [citing Ownbey]. It is much less clear what interests were involved
in the third case, decided with an unexplicated per curiam opinion simply citing
Coffin Brothers and Ownbey [citing McKay]. As far as essential procedural due
process doctrine goes, McKay cannot stand for any more than was established in
the Coffin Brothers and Ownbey cases on which it relied completely.
407 U.S. at 91 n.23. In addition to suggesting that the nonresidence of a debtor is a
sufficient circumstance to justify summary seizure, the Court's note is in agreement with
the manner in which Justice Douglas distinguished the earlier attachment cases in
Sniadach. See p. 240 supra.
58. In its discussion of the deficiencies of the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes,
the Court commented: "There may be cases in which a creditor could make a showing of
immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or' conceal disputed goods. But the
statutes before us are not 'narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition."'
407 U.S. at 93.
59. Id.
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PART III: THE MARYLAND STATUTES
A. Attachment
The Supreme Court's decision in Sniadach triggered attacks on state
prejudgment attachment statutes throughout the country.6" At least
five state statutes were declared unconstitutional on the basis that the
principles underlying that decision extended beyond mere garnishment
of wages. 6 Courts in Arizona, Connecticut and Hawaii ruled that
Sniadach had merely made an exception to the general validity of
prejudgment attachments;6 2 but after Fuentes was decided, at least
three more state statutes were held unconstitutional,6 ' and it appears
that only Arizona has insisted that its statute remains valid.6 4
The Maryland procedure for attachments on original process,6 5
unlike the statutes found unconstitutional in Sniadach and Fuentes, is
narrowly drawn.6 6 Although any property of the debtor may be
attached,6 ' the use of attachments on original process is limited to five
situations:6 (a) when the debtor is a non-resident; (b) when a resident
defendant has been twice returned non-est; (c) when the
debtor has absconded or is about to abscond; (d) when the debtor has
or is about to conceal his assets to defraud creditors, or has
fraudulently contracted the debt, and (e) when the debtor is a
nonresident heir or devisee. To obtain the writ, the creditor must file a
60. For a more detailed discussion of attachment and garnishment see Note, 68 MICH L.
REV. 986; Note, Attachment in California, A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1254 (1970); Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment In Light of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837 (1970).
61. McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Randone v. Appellate Dep't
of the Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services,
Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Lucas v. Stapp, 6 Wash. App. 971, 497 P.2d
500 (1972); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
62. Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); American Olean
Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Termplan, Inc. v. Su-
perior Ct. of Maricopa County, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969).
63. McClellan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1013 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd mem.,
93 S. Ct. 935 (1973); Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972);
Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146 (Alas. 1972).
64. Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz. 508, 502 P.2d 1327 (1972). But see Western
Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 344 F. Supp. 1136 (D. Ariz. 1972).
65. MD. ANN. CODE art. 9, §§ 1-49 (1968). The procedural rules implementing the
statutory provisions are found in MD. R. Civ. P. G40-61. The comparable provisions
for the Maryland District Courts are found in MD. DIST. R. Civ. P. G40-61.
66. For a useful discussion of the competing interests involved in a broadly drawn prejudg-
ment attachment statute see Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Super. Ct. of Sacra-
mento County, 5 Cal. App. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 924 (1972).
67. MD. R. Civ. P. G45. Limitations on attachment of wages are set forth in MD. ANN. CODE
art. 9, §§ 31-32 (1968).
68. MD. R. Civ. P. G40. An attachment is available under sections (a) and (c) of Rule G40
in actions either ex contractu or ex delicto. An attachment is available under sections
(b), (d) and (e) of Rule G40 only in an action ex contractu for liquidated damages. Id. G41.
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declaration, an affidavit stating that he believes he is entitled to the
writ, documentary evidence of his claim and a bond in the amount of
the claim for attachments under sections (a), (c) and (d) of Rule
G40.6 9 The writ is served by posting a copy of it on real property or by
seizure and sequestration of tangible personal property.7 0 In an
attachment by way of garnishment, the writ is served upon the person
holding property belonging to the defendant. 7 ' The debtor may file a
motion to quash the attachment and obtain an immediate hearing on
his motion,7 2 or he may dissolve the attachment by giving a bond in an
amount equal to the value of the property attached.7 3
There should be no serious question as to the validity of subsections
(a) and (e) of Rule G40. The use of prejudgment attachments for the
purpose of enabling residents to adjudicate claims against nonresidents
has long been recognized. 74  In both Sniadach and Fuentes the Court
affirmed the use of attachments without prior notice and hearing when
necessary to obtain jurisdiction, 75  and the California,7 6  Pennsyl-
vania7 7 and District of Columbia 7 1 foreign attachment statutes have
been upheld in cases decided after Sniadach.7 ' Foreign attachment
69. Id. G42.
70. Id. G46. In Maryland attachment of the property of the debtor creates an inchoate lien
in favor of the plaintiff. Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927). It
is arguable that the mere imposition of a lien on real property, which, unlike personal
property, is not seized and sequestered, is not a significant taking and therefore not
restricted by the fourteenth amendment. The defendant remains in possession of the
property, but the attachment restricts his ability to sell or encumber it. At least one
court has found that the taking is significant. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Rogers, 41
U.S.L.W. 2492 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Feb. 21, 1973). But cf. Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick,
323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971). See also note 15 supra; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,
74 (1917).
71. MD. R. Civ. P. G47.
72. Id. G51.
73. Id. G57.
74. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
75. See notes 23 & 57 supra.
76. Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Ct. for County of Los Angeles, 23
Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972); Banks v. Superior Ct., City & County of
San Francisco, 26 Cal. App. 3d 143, 103 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1972); Ortleb v. Superior Ct. for
County of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. App. 3d 424, 100 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1972).
77. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972), ,cert. denied,
409 U.S. 843 (1972).
78. In Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970), where the wages of a Maryland,
debtor employed in the District of Columbia were garnished by a Maryland corporation,
the court found that the debtor's nonresidence was a special circumstance justifying
garnishment without prior notice and hearing under the District of Columbia statute.
Judge Wright, dissenting, would have held that the use of the statute under these
circumstances was unconstitutional because in personam jurisdiction was readily
available-either in Maryland where the debtor lived and the creditor did business or in
the District of Columbia where the debtor worked. But cf. Mills v. Bartlett, _-Del.__ 265
A.2d 39 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, -_Del._ 272 A.2d 702 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1970) kapplication of the Delaware wage garnishment statute held unconstitutional
despite the wage-earner's nonresidence).
79. Cf. U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972). Gordon v. Michel,
__Del. Ch.-., 297 A.2d 420 (1972) (both cases upheld Delaware sequestration statute,
which is analogous to a statute providing for foreign attachment).
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serves the important state interest of providing a forum for residents of
a state in actions against nonresidents. Notice, prior to the attachment
would defeat its purpose, because the defendant would then have an
opportunitv to dispose of the property or to remove it from the state.
When an alternative procedure for obtaining jurisdiction is available,
the justification for summary seizure no longer exists, and the creditor
should not be permitted to attach the debtor's property within the
state without prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing. For
example, to the extent that the creditor may invoke jurisdiction under
the Maryland statute governing in personam jurisdiction,8" it is
arguable that he should be denied the use of summary prejudgment
attachment. The statute provides that Maryland courts may exercise
jurisdiction over any person' ' as to a cause of action arising from any
of a number of activities conducted in the state, including ownership or
use of real property. Unless the nonresident is conducting some other
activity within the state, the statute applies to ownership of real
property but not personal property. Further, the cause of action must
arise as a result of the activity or ownership.
It is clear that the Maryland long-arm statute does not authorize in
personam jurisdiction in all cases where quasi-in-rem jurisdiction may
be obtained by foreign attachment. Nor should the plaintiff be required
to engage in litigation (which he may eventually lose) merely to
determine whether the long-arm statute confers jurisdiction in a
particular case.8 2 Although the need for foreign attachments to obtain
jurisdiction is probably no longer as great as before the long-arm
statute, they are justified and should be retained, despite the possibility
of invoking jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.8 3
A more difficult question is presented when the defendant enters a
general appearance, thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the court.
Once the defendant has entered a general appearance and in personam
jurisdiction is obtained, any judgment validly obtained by the creditor
may be enforced in any other state.8 4 In the absence of other unusual
circumstances, the governmental interest justifying summary prejudg-
ment attachment (that of compelling the nonresident's appearance) no
longer exists, and the attachment should accordingly be dissolved.
The Maryland procedure allows a defendant who has appeared to
dissolve an attachment by giving a bond in an amount equal to the
value of the property attached.8 I The requirement of posting a bond as
80. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, §§ 94-100 (1969).
81. Person is defined to include any individual, corporation, partnership or other commercial
entity. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 94 (1969).
82. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 843 (1972).
83. See Note, Attachment in California, A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1254, 1261-62 (1970).
84. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
85. MD. R. Civ. P. G57.
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a condition to dissolving the attachment is itself a taking of property.8 6
If the defendant has submitted to the court's jurisdiction, the
justification for either the original seizure or the bond requirement no
longer exists. Thus, to the extent that the Maryland procedure allows
dissolution of the attachment after a general appearance only upon
condition that the defendant file a bond, it should be found
unconstitutional. 7
The remaining circumstances in which the Maryland statute
authorizes summary prejudgment attachment appear to be within the
language of Sniadach and Fuentes, authorizing such seizures in
extraordinary circumstances-when the debtor is absconding or is about
to abscond with intent to defraud his creditors;8 8 when the debtor has
concealed or disposed of his assets or is attempting to do so;' 9
when a debtor cannot be located for personal service;90 and when the
debtor has fraudulently contracted the debt.'' The state interest in
making its process locally effective and in .providing a remedy for
creditors should justify the use of the attachment procedure in these
situations.
A possible weakness in the Maryland procedure is the abdication of
state control over use of the attachment procedure.9 2 Currently, a
creditor may obtain the writ of attachment simply by filing an affidavit
which sets forth his belief that he is entitled to have it issued,9 and by
filing a bond to ensure that the debtor may recover damages if the
attachment is wrongful. 9 4 The weakness of this procedure is that it
86. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972).
87. Although agreeing with this view, one court has refused to dissolve a foreign attachment
after entry of a general appearance on the ground that the reasoning of Ownbey and
McKay precluded such action and those cases had not been overruled. Lebowitz v.
Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979, 982 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843
(1972). Lebowitz was decided prior to Fuentes; however, Fuentes did not overrule
McKay and it affirmed Ownbey. See note 57 supra. For a case suggesting that Sniadach
had overruled McKay see Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Super. Ct. of Sacramento
County, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 551-52 n.13, 488 P.2d 13, 23 n.13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721 n.13
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972).
88. MD. R. Civ. P. G40(c).
89. Id. G40(d).
90. Id. G40(b). In Jernigan v. Economy Exterminating Co., 327 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 943 (1972), the inability of the plaintiff to locate the de-
fendant for a period of several weeks was found to justify- the use of the Georgia bail
trover statute to obtain repossession of a car without prior notice and hearing.
91. MD. R. Civ. P. G40(d).
92. In Fuentes the abdication of state control over the use of the Pennsylvania and Florida
replevin procedures was one factor in the Court's holding that the statutes were un-
constitutional. The Court said:
The statutes, moreover, abdicate effective state control over state power. Pri-
vate parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally invoke state
power to replevy goods from another. No state official participates in the decision
to seek a writ; no state official reviews the basis for the claim to repossession; and
no state official evaluates the need for immediate seizure.
407 U.S. at 93.
93. MD. R. Civ. P. G42(b).
94. Id. G42(e).
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allows the creditor unilaterally to invoke state power merely on his
belief that he is entitled to do so. Since the affidavit is not required to
state the facts justifying the creditor's belief, nor is it reviewed by a
state official to determine the need for summary seizure, it is possible
that a successful challenge may be made to the Maryland procedure on
this basis. However, since Maryland's attachment on original process
procedure is narrowly drawn, it should survive constitutional challenge
with the addition of the above safeguards.
B. Replevin
The Maryland replevin procedure9" is essentially similar to the
Florida procedure found to be unconstitutional in Fuentes-a creditor
obtains the writ of replevin by filing a replevin bond of double the
value of the property claimed,9 6 and a declaration in the replevin
action is filed either simultaneously or within fifteen days after the
execution of the writ by seizing the property and transferring it to the
creditor.' " Unless he was in possession by force or fraud, the defendant
may obtain its return9 8 provided he files his own bond in the amount
of the replevin bond.9" The verdict in the replevin action awards
possession of the property and damages, if any, for its wrongful
detention.' 0 0 The Maryland procedure does not provide for the
requisite notice and hearing prior to seizure of the goods, nor is its use
limited to extraordinary situations.' 0 Although no challenge has been
95. MD. R. Civ. P. BQ40-52. The procedure followed by the Maryland District Courts is
similar. MD. DIST. R. Civ. P. BQ4O-52.




- 100. Id. BQ49.
101. Fuentes was based on the fourteenth amendment. The fourth amendment has also been
urged as a basis for invalidating replevin statutes. The protection of the fourth amend-
ment from unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to criminal cases but ex-
tends to the civil area as well. Camara v. Municipal Ct. of the City & County of San
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The argument is that the entry and seizure of chattels by
the sheriff or other state officer without a warrant constitutes an unreasonable search
and seizure. The issue was raised but not reached in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96 n.32. As
the Court pointed out the issue is probably immaterial as a result of its decision-usually,
at least, the officer no longer enters without court approval because a prior hearing on
the probable validity of the creditor's claim is required. Other courts have found
replevin statutes unconstitutional based at least in part on the fourth amendment
argument. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722
(N.D.N.Y. 1970):
If the sheriff cannot invade the privacy of a home without a warrant when the
state interest is to prevent crime, he should not be able to do so to retrieve a
stove or refrigerator about which the right to possession is disputed. Nor should
he have any greater right to make a seizure.., by virtue of a requisition 'deemed
to be the mandate of the court' ... but which in fact is the mandate of the
plaintiffs attorney issued without the examination or approval of an intervening
magistrate. ....
See Dorsey v. Community Stores Corp., 346 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Blair v.
Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
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made to it,' 0 2 the procedure is clearly unconstitutional.' 03
A procedure complying with the requirements of Fuentes is
currently being used in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, an equity
court.' 04 A creditor seeking to obtain possession of chattels files a
petition setting forth the facts which constitute his right to possession,
and requests that a trustee be appointed to take charge of the property
and sell it.' 0 ' The court orders the defendant to appear in person to
show cause why the trustee should not be appointed and the property
seized and sold. The date for appearing to answer this order is
shortened to seven days after its issuance.' 06 If the creditor is
successful in establishing his claim at the hearing, or if the defendant
does not appear, the court orders the trustee to take possession of the
property and sell it to satisfy the obligation and costs of repossession
and sale.' 0 7 If necessary, the debtor should be permitted a
postponement, but normally the issues and the proofs required will be
quite simple and can be adjudicated at an early hearing.
This procedure not only ensures that the debtor's right to notice and
an opportunity for a hearing prior to seizure of his property is
protected, but also it offers some protection to creditor interests. First,
to the extent that a creditor may obtain rapid adjudication of his claim,
he is not so needful of the protection afforded by pretrial seizure of the
disputed goods: the circuit court's procedure allows a creditor to obtain
judgment in only seven days, absent good reason for delay. Second, the
costs and delays resulting from holding two hearings (one to attempt to
102. Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971), decided prior to Fuentes,
found that the procedure followed by the People's Court of Baltimore City did not
violate due process even though it did not provide for notice and hearing prior to is-
suance of the writ of replevin. For a description of the procedure, which varied from
that proscribed in the Maryland Rules, see id. at 648-50. The People's Court is now a
district court.
103. For cases holding other replevin statutes unconstitutional see Turner v. Colonial Fin.
Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972) (Mississippi); Mitchell v. Tennessee, 351 F. Supp.
846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972); Dorsey v. Community Stores Corp. 346 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (decided prior to Fuentes); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F.
Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42 (1971); Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Barr, 200 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa 1972); Inter City
Motor Sales, Inc. v. Szymanski, 42 Mich. App. 112, 201 N.W.2d 378 (1972); Montoya v.
Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972).
104. See Tatelbaum, Flower or Thorn? The Unconstitutionality of Replevins, 5 MD. B.J.
no. 1, at 20 (Oct. 1972), which describes the procedure more fully.
105. MD. R. Civ. P. BR1-6.
106. The court may order rapid service. Id. 102 provides: "The return day for all summonses
and other process requiring action by a defendant or by the sheriff or an officer of
the court shall be the first Monday in each month except as otherwise stated in such
process." The summons may require special handling to insure its timely service. To
further ensure that the defendant receives adequate notice, the plaintiff is required in
the circuit court's procedure to notify the defendant and to inform him of his right to
appear and to offer a defense.
107. If the property is collateral for a secured transaction the sale is made pursuant to
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504. The comparable Maryland provision is MD.
ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 9-504 (1964). If § 9-504 does not apply, the sale is made
pursuant to MD. R. Civ. P. BR3-4, 6.
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obtain possession of the disputed goods and the other to obtain
judgment) are avoided.
If the creditor believes the procedure described above does not
provide sufficient protection to his interests in a given case, he may
seek an ex parte injunction restraining the debtor from selling or
otherwise disposing of the disputed property prior to the hearing. The
request for an ex parte injunction may be presented to the judge at the
same time as the request for a show cause order. To obtain the
injunction, the creditor must demonstrate by specific facts in an
affidavit (or a verified pleading) that unless the injunction is issued he
will suffer "immediate, substantial and irreparable injury" before the
hearing can be held.' 0 8 If the creditor is successful in obtaining the
injunction, his interest in the property is protected by the threat of
contempt proceedings against any defendant who violates the court's
order.' 09 The injunction restraining the debtor from disposing of his
property is itself a taking of property-the right to dispose of an
interest in property freely.1 ' However, this taking should meet the
Fuentes requirements. Because an ex parte injunction will only issue in
extraordinary circumstances, if the creditor can establish facts showing
that he is entitled to an ex parte injunction, he has thereby
demonstrated a situation justifying prejudgment seizure.
Further, unlike the Florida replevin procedure found unconstitu-
tional in Fuentes, the circuit court's procedure does not abdicate state
control over the use of state power. A judicial officer reviews the
request for an injunction as well as the facts supporting the creditor's
belief in his need therefor, and the judge has discretion to communicate
informally with the defendant prior to acting on the creditor's
request.' 1 This judicial scrutiny gives further protection to the
debtor's interests.
The circuit court's procedure appears to be a compromise between
the interests of creditors and debtors that meets the Fuentes
requirements. To facilitate use of this procedure, it is likely that the
Maryland District Courts will be given equity power and sole
jurisdiction of replevin actions. Although other procedures for
complying with Fuentes may be developed, the circuit court's
procedure appears to be adequate, at least for the moment.
C. Self-help Repossession
Perhaps a more important question in terms of economic effect on
retail installment sellers is whether a creditor may resort to self-help
108. MD. R. CIr. P. BB72.
109. Id. BB80.
110. See note 70 supra.
111. MD. R. Civ. P. BB72.
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repossession and proceed without judicial process. Proceeding pursuant
to a contractual provision and without a prior opportunity for a
hearing, the creditor or his agent enters the debtor's premises, seizes the
disputed goods and disposes of them. No state official participates and
no judicial sanction is necessary. Self-help recapture is a common
practice today in the event of default on installment sales contracts,
and is authorized by the Uniform Commercial Code.' 1 2
While there can be no doubt after Fuentes that the fourteenth
amendment, if applicable, would invalidate such summary procedure,
the fourteenth amendment operates only when state action is involved.
It generally does not apply to private conduct,' ' although private acts
may be reached if there is sufficient involvement with the state.' I' The
most tenuous application of the fourteenth amendment to the private
sphere was made in Reitman v. Mulkey,' I ' where the Supreme Court
considered an amendment to the California constitution which had the
effect of repealing that state's legislation prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion in the sale or lease of real estate. The Court held the amendment
unconstitutional because it established a state policy which encouraged
private racial discrimination. The encouragement given was held to be
sufficient state involvement to bring the private conduct within the
fourteenth amendment.
The applicability of the fourteenth amendment to self-help
repossession depends on the scope to be given to Reitman. In a recent
decision,' '6 a federal district court found that creditors were induced
to include clauses providing for self-help recapture in their installment
sales contracts because the Uniform Commercial Code authorized such
action. Relying on Reitman, the court held that because the state
policy so established encouraged repossession in violation of the due
process right to prior notice and hearing, the state was sufficiently
involved in the private acts of repossession to bring those actions within
the fourteenth amendment. It should be noted, however, that at least
seven other courts have been unwilling to give Reitman so broad a
112. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. Maryland has a similar statutory provision.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 9-503 (1964), provides: "Unless otherwise agreed a se-
cured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking pos-
session a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done
without breach of the peace or may proceed by action .... " MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B,
§ 9-504 (1964) authorizes the' secured party to dispose of the collateral and to apply the
proceeds to satisfaction of the indebtedness and the expenses of retaking and disposal.
The Retail Installment Sales Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 141(a) (1969), also authorizes
self-help repossession. Section 141(b) provides that the seller or his assignee may give
notice of his intention to repossess at least ten days before he does so. Section 142(a)(3)
provides that unless he gives notice, he cannot recover the costs of retaking and storing.
113. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
114. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
115. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
116. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
1973]
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sweep,1 ' ' and even a district court in the same state has disagreed.' 1 8
There, Reitman was found to be inapplicable because it dealt with
racial discrimination, the area where the fourteenth amendment has had
its greatest impact, and thus should have been limited to similar
situations.' ' 9 Still another district court' 2 0 reached a similar result by
reasoning that the purpose of the constitutional amendment considered
in Reitman had been to authorize what had formerly been illegal under
California statutes. In contrast, the Uniform Commercial Code merely
codified what had formerly been a common and accepted practice.' 2
While the weight of authority is certainly with the courts holding that
the fourteenth amendment is not applicable to self-help repossession
pursuant to contractual right,' 2 2 no safe prediction can be made as to
whether that procedure will survive the current attack on creditors'
remedies.
Conditional sellers may be able to avoid the impact of Fuentes by
including waiver provisions in their conditional sales contracts. As is
true with respect to other constitutional rights, the right to prior notice
117. Calvin v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 4 CCH SECURED TRANS. GUIDE 52,046 (D. Utah Jan. 4,
1973); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Kirksey v. Theilig,
4 CCH SECURED TRANS. GUIDE 52,003 (D. Col. Nov. 30, 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l
Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank,
322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Kipp v. Cozens, 4 CCH SECURED TRANS. GUIDE
51,980 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 26, 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.
Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
118. OIler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
119. The court stated:
Reitman, which dealt with racial discrimination in violation of the due process
clause, clearly presented a compelling factual situation to which the Civil Rights
Acts and their jurisdictional counterparts were designed to apply. The historical,
legal and moral considerations fundamental to extending federal jurisdiction to
meet racial injustices are simply not present in the instant case.
Id. at 23.
120. Kirksey v. Theilig, 4 CCH SECURED TRANS. GUIDE 52,003 (D. Col. Nov. 30, 1972).
121. Id. Accord, Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972)
(codification of the ancient practice of self-help and surrounding it with procedural safe-
guards did not bring it within the fourteenth amendment).
122. The result might be otherwise if the creditor neglected to include a provision in the in-
stallment sales contract authorizing him to repossess and then proceeded pursuant to
the authority conferred by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. The situation would then
be analogous to that of a landlord entering the leased premises and seizing the property
of his tenant to satisfy the tenant's rent obligation pursuant to a distress statute
authorizing action without resort to judicial process. As in self-help repossession, the
question is raised as to whether the landlord's seizure is state action so as to make the
fourteenth amendment applicable. The courts considering this question have found that
it is and have held such statutes unconstitutional for failing to provide for notice and
hearing prior to the seizure. See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Gross v.
Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Macqueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D.
Fla. 1972); Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel
Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. 11. 1972) (innkeepers' lien unconstitutional); Klim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeepers' lien unconstitutional). These cases in-
volve considerable stretching of the fourteenth amendment by broad application of past
Supreme Court decisions dealing with racial discrimination to debtors' rights.
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and hearing may be waived.' 2'3 However, there is a strong presumption
against such a waiver,'24 and a court must find that the waiver has
been knowing and intelligent before it will be upheld.' 25
In Fuentes it was argued that the debtors had waived the right to
prior notice and hearing because the conditional sales contracts they
had signed provided that the seller could repossess the goods in the
event of default. The Court found that these provisions merely gave the
seller the right to repossess without specifying through what process he
might do so, and consequently the contractual provisions did not
amount to a waiver.' 26 The Court pointed out that the contracts were
of adhesion, that the parties were far from equal in bargaining power
and that the seller had not shown that the debtors were actually aware
of the significance of the provisions relied upon as a waiver.' 
2 7
Although the Court did not rely on these facts in concluding that there
was no waiver, its language indicates that future attempts by vendors to
enforce waiver provisions in installment sales contracts for consumer
goods will probably be unsuccessful.' 2
In another recent case,' 29 however, the Supreme Court held that a
cognovit clause in a promissory note had waived the maker's right to
notice and a hearing prior to entry of judgment upon a default in
payment. The facts were significantly different from those in Fuentes,
as the provision authorizing the confession of judgment resulted from
negotiations between corporate parties and the creditor had given
consideration therefor. The Court commented that the result might be
different in other cases where it was not so clear that the waiver had
been knowing and intelligent.
These cases suggest the following requirements for a valid waiver
provision: (1) it must specifically state that by it the debtor waives his
right to notice and hearing prior to seizure of the collateral, and not
merely that the seller has the right to repossess on default; (2) it should
state the consequences resulting from waiver in language that a layman
could easily understand; (3) it must be made conspicuous, for instance,
by including it in capital letters in red print immediately above the
signature blank, or in a separately executed portion of the form; and
(4) the creditor should state the consideration, if any, given for the
waiver provision.
While it is unlikely that even a waiver provision meeting the above
123. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
124. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972), and cases cited therein.
125. As the Court stated in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970): "Waivers of
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."
126. 407 U.S. at 95-96.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
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requirements would withstand attack in a consumer contract,' ° it
would meet most of the objections raised in the recent decisions and
should be upheld where the contract is not one of adhesion.' 3 If the
provision is upheld, the creditor may proceed either pursuant to the
present replevin procedure or through self-help.
D. Distress
Distress is an ancient common law remedy' 3 2 entitling the landlord
to seize all personal property on the premises and retain it as a pledge
until the tenant redeems it by paying the past due rent. Originally, the
landlord did not have the right to sell the property distrained, but a
statute later authorized the distrainor to sell the property and to apply
the proceeds to satisfaction of the rent and the expenses incurred in the
distraint.' 3 3  In Maryland, the common law remedy has been
superseded by statute.' 34
Under the Maryland procedure, the landlord may bring an action of
distress for unpaid rent in the district court having jurisdiction of the
area in which the leased premises lie.' s' He initiates the action by
filing a petition alleging the amount of rent in arrears,' 36 whereupon
the court issues an order directing levy on all goods on the leased
premises not exempted by law.' 3 The officer making the levy is
required to serve a copy of the petition and order of levy upon each
130. Kosches v. Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 797, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971):
"Needless to say, the clauses giving the seller the right to enter a debtor's residence and
seize the goods without a court order are unconscionable. One clause.., even gives the
seller the right to enter and seize any OTHER property without court order." In Gross-
man Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 119 N.J. Super. 411, 291 A.2d 858 (Dist. Ct. 1972), the court
reformed the contract to exclude the clause of an installment sales contract allowing re-
capture partly because it was not conspicuous. See Murray, Unconscionability: Un-
conscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969).
131. A contractual waiver provision was found to waive a corporate defendant's right to prior
notice and hearing in a replevin action in Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100
(10th Cir. 1970). The clause provided that upon default the creditor "may take immedi-
ate possession of said property and for this purpose the Seller may enter the premises
where said property may be and remove the same without notice or demand, and with
or without legal process .... "Id. at 105.
132. For a history of the common law action see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW, 574-78 (2d ed. 1968); 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,
281-87 (5th ed. 1942).
133. 2 W. & M., c. 5, § 2, 2 ALEXANDER'S BRITISH STATUTES 774-75 (Coe ed. 1912).
134. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 8-301 to -331 (Supp. 1972). Section 8-302(a) provides: "Dis-
tress for rent is hereby declared to be an action at law which shall be brought as pro-
vided herein." Unlike the statutes considered in the cases cited in note 122 supra, the
Maryland statute does not authorize the landlord to resort to self-help.
135. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-302 (Supp. 1972).
136. Id. § 8-303.
137. Id. § 8-304. The property exempted from levy is described in § 8-308. Goods may be
levied upon regardless of whether they are owned by the tenant or by a third party. Id.
§ 8-305. As to the rights of a third party whose goods are levied upon see id. §§ 8-310,
-322. The statute authorizes forcible entry to make levy at any hour of the day or night;
but, if the property is used as a dwelling, forcible entry may be made only if the levying
officer cannot otherwise make entry and the court so orders. Id. § 8-307.
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tenant on the leased premises.' 3 If personal service cannot be made,
the officer posts the petition and order on the interior of the
premises.' ' Thus, the tenant first learns of the distress action at the
time of, or after, seizure of his property. The effect of levy is to give
the landlord a lien upon the goods until they are sold to satisfy the rent
obligation;' ' 0 in the interim they are held in custodia legis.' '' The
court may order removal of the goods levied upon if the landlord shows
a need for such protection." '  The tenant may petition the court to
order that the goods levied upon or seized be released from the claim
for distress;' 4 but as a condition of release, the court may require the
filing of a bond to indemnify the landlord if he suffers loss as a result of
the release.' 44 Alternatively, the tenant may file an answer to the
distress action setting forth any defense he may have.' 4 s If the tenant
fails to answer, or if the court finds in favor of the landlord, the court
may order a sale of the goods.' 46
The Maryland statute appears to be deficient in light of Sniadach and
Fuentes. Although the tenant is not deprived of possession of the goods
unless the landlord can show a need for removal, once the levy has been
made, the landlord acquires a lien on the goods. The imposition of this
lien is itself a taking of a significant property right-the right to dispose
of one's property,' and the statute makes no provision for notice
and hearing prior to this taking. It is true that the statute provides for
recovery of the property free of the lien, and therefore, the taking is, to
that extent, only temporary. But Sniadach and Fuentes established that
even a temporary and conditional taking is within the protection of the
fourteenth amendment.' 48 Moreover, the provision that the defendant
may be required to post a bond to obtain release of his property is itself
a taking of property.' ' Further, the statute is not narrowly drawn so
as to allow prejudgment taking only in extraordinary situations. Such
138. Id.§ 8-304.
139. Id.
140. Id. § 8-311.
141. Id. § 8-306.
142. Id.§ 8-309. The court may order the landlord to post a bond as a condition of removal. Id.
143. Id. § 8-315.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 8-313. The tenant may also bring an action in replevin. MD. R. Cry. P. BQ48(b).
146. MD. ANN CODE art. 21, § 8-313 (Supp. 1972).
147. The Pennsylvania distress statute found unconstitutional in Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp.
1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972), also contained a provision allowing a distraint without actual re-
moval of the tenant's goods from the premises. Unlawful removal of the goods levied
upon would enable the landlord to initiate a trespass action and recover treble damages
from the offender. The court found that the tenant was deprived of the opportunity to
dispose of his goods-a taking of a significant property interest. The Maryland procedure
does not contain a provision authorizing treble damages but does provide for issuance of
an order to follow the goods if removed. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-314 (Supp. 1972). And
because the goods levied upon are in custodia legis, removal of them would subject the
tenant to contempt proceedings. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 4 (1966), and MD. DisT. R.
Civ. P. P1-5 (1972). See notes 15 & 70 supra.
148. See p. 243 supra.
149. See p. 243 supra.
1973]
Baltimore Law Review
situations might include those when the tenant is a nonresident, has
twice been returned non-est or is absconding with or attempting to
conceal his assets; but the Maryland statute is not limited to such
situations.
A procedure similar to that devised by the Baltimore City Circuit
Court for replevin actions could be used to comply with due process
requirements in distress actions, while at the same time protecting the
interests of landlords.1 ' 0 By including provisions in their lease forms
that operate as a waiver of the tenant's right to prior notice and
hearing, landlords may be able to continue to use the present distress
procedure." ' As in the replevin situation, such provisions would be
subject to a defense of unconscionability.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Sniadach and Fuentes has struck a new balance in the
interests of creditors and debtors. Except in unusual circumstances the
right of a debtor to notice and a hearing prior to any significant taking
of his property will outweigh both the interests of his creditors and any
state interest in their protection. The results are that the creditor
is not assured at the initiation of his action that a fund will exist out of
which he may satisfy his claim.
It is not yet clear how far the principles established by Sniadach and
Fuentes will be extended. Although it appears that the Maryland
prejudgment attachment procedure will survive Sniadach and Fuentes,
the Maryland replevin and distress procedures will not, and no firm
prediction can be made as to the continued validity of self-help
repossession. Nor are these the only creditors' remedies subject to
constitutional attack: confessed judgments. 52 and mortgage fore-
closures' 1 3 have also been challenged, although thus far, unsuccess-
fully.
150. See pp. 251-52 supra.
151. See pp. 254-56 supra.
152. In D. H. Overmyer Co. v Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), the Court held that a confessed
judgment note was not per se unconstitutional, but suggested that entry of a confessed
judgment might be violative of due process in some circumstances. For other recent
cases concerning the validity of confessed judgments see Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191
(1972), affg 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349
(D. Del. 1971), vacated mem., 405 U.S. 971 (1972); International Equity Corp. v. Pepper
& Tanner, Inc., 222 Pa. Super. 118, 293 A.2d 108 (1972), appeal dismissed mem., 93 S.
Ct. 556 (1972). See also Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972). For helpful
commentary see Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHL L. REv. 111 (1961); Note, Cognovit Judgments: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 70 COL. L. REv. 1118 (1970); Note, Due Process-Confes-
sion of Judgment Procedures Are Not Unconstitutional Per Se, 25 VAND. L. REV. 613
(1972). The Maryland procedure for entry of judgments by confession is MD. R. Civ.
P. 645.
153. See Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970). The Maryland procedure on fore-
closure of mortgages may be found in MD. R. Civ. P. W70-80. In particular see MD. R.
Civ. P. W71(c), (d)(1), W72(d). Cf. Buckner v. Carmack, __La.-., 272 So. 2d 326 (1973).
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It is clear, however, that the recent changes in the balance of
creditors' and debtors' rights will have a significant effect on the
commercial world." ' The requirement of a prior hearing will
obviously increase collection costs, which will doubtless be passed along
to all debtors. Because the only effective way to limit these costs will
be to select credit risks with greater care, the result may be to dry up
credit in areas where it would have been available prior to Sniadach and
Fuentes." ' The full impact of Sniadach and Fuentes cannot be
determined until the limits of the application of the principles
underlying those decisions are ascertained; nevertheless, it is apparent
that the impact will be substantial.
154. For a discussion of the economics of self-help repossession see Messenger v. Sandy
Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 10-12, 295 A.2d 402, 406-08 (1972).
155. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 103 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
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